Introduction
Karel Wellens has devoted quite an important part of his academic and professional life to working inside the ILA on the vital issue of the accountability and responsibility of international organisations.
1 Some years ago he dedicated a perceptive study to this subject. 2 One of the important themes in this fi eld of study is the question if and how international organisations can be made accountable for their alleged breaches of fundamental rights of individuals. Ironically this question has come to the surface recently inter alia as a consequence of the fact that UN economic sanctions which traditionally were directed against States and thus hit the whole population of States, were considered to be of doubtful legality and political legitimacy insofar as they also hurt -and oft en in disproportionate fashion -vulnerable groups in society, such as children and sick people. 3 Th is led to the rise of individualised sanctions or 'smart sanctions' , that is to say sanctions that were directed originally against members of the government, or high civilian or military personnel of the government, of the sanctioned country and later, aft er the rise of Al Qaeda, the Taliban and international terrorist groups, also against individuals without government affi liation, but with a link to such terrorist groups. 4 Th e sanctions imposed on the persons listed in the annexes to the relevant resolutions were mostly of economic or fi nancial nature, principally so-called asset freezes, which made it 72 laurence boisson de chazournes and pieter jan kuijper 5 See, for instance, paragraph 4 (b) of UNSC res. 1267, which reads: "[All states shall] freeze funds and other fi nancial resources, including funds derived or generated from property owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the Taliban, or by any undertaking owned or controlled by the Taliban, as designated by the Committee established by paragraph 6 below, and ensure that neither they nor any other funds or fi nancial resources so designated are made available, by their nationals or by any persons within their territory, to or for the benefi t of the Taliban or any undertaking owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the Taliban, except as may be authorized by the Committee on a case-by-case basis on the grounds of humanitarian need. 8 Th e reluctance to disclose the information on the basis of which an individual or an entity was added to the list is confi rmed by the arguments raised by the EU institutions and the inter- impossible for them to dispose of their fi nancial resources except insofar as they were necessary for their basic subsistence. 5 As is well known from the literature, 6 these sanctions were imposed without any warning or hearing on the facts which were supposed to show that the persons targeted belonged to, supported, fi nanced, delivered arms to, or were otherwise affi liated with such terrorist groups. If that was still considered acceptable, given that the money that was going to be blocked could be removed in a second, as soon as the person concerned would have been advised of the reasons for the incipient freezing of his/her assets, 7 it was highly doubtful if, once the measures had been imposed, such persons should also remain bereft of any opportunity to be heard about the reality of such links or even about such a simple issue as a possible confusion of identities. Even if such "hearing" was granted, the information to be had was oft en minimal, since the various national intelligence agencies that originally pushed for inclusion of these persons on the sanctions list, were very intent on protecting their sources. 8 It is remarkable that many of the court cases concerning the breach of fundamental rights by international organisations in the course of imposing individual sanctions come from the courts of regional organisations or from courts charged with interpreting a regional international agreement, such as the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union. In this way, these cases also raise the issue of the relationship of the jurisdictions of regional organisations to organisations at the world level, in particular the UN and its organ for the maintenance of international peace and security, the Security Council. 9 In respect of the solange doctrine of the German Constitutional Court, see Solange I, 29 May 1974, BVerGe 37, 271 and Solange II, 22 October 1986, BVerGe 75, 339. As to an application of this doctrine between European regional courts, see for instance Nikolaos Lavranos, 'Th e Solange-dialogue between the ECJ and ECrtHR' (2008) 11 European Law Reporter, p. 384.
For these reasons, it is fi tting to contribute this paper on questions of accountability of international organisations, questions which at the same time raise issues of hierarchy between international organisations, to this volume in honour of Karel Wellens. We hope that it will also shed some light on the direction in which these fundamental questions will evolve.
In the following we will fi rst recall the situation as it evolved through diff erent cases until the end of the summer of 2010. Th is will be done briefl y and cursorily, since we believe that these cases are widely known. Th is will result in an evocation of the situation as it was in September 2010. Secondly, we will then analyse the further developments during autumn and winter of 2010 with a view to assessing the situation at present and to discussing in which direction it is likely to evolve. Th is will cause us to review in particular the creation of the offi ce of the UN Ombudsperson and the fi rst steps of Mrs Kimberley Prost who was appointed to this new offi ce, as well as the judgment of the EU General Court in the Kadi 2010 case and what might be the likely consequences of these developments. individual case to review the taking of such measures in detail for reasons of human rights. 10 However, in a later case concerning the responsibility for serious accidents resulting from the omission by UNMIK to clear unexploded anti-personnel weapons and excessively long detention by French and Norwegian troop contingents of KFOR 11 , the ECtHR constructed the line of command between these national troop contingents and the UN so generously that only the UN might ultimately be held responsible for these actions and omissions. Since the ECtHR had no jurisdiction ratione personae over the UN, the practical result was total judicial indulgence in respect of the two national troop contingents. All the more so, since the national jurisdictions of the countries involved in the Kosovo operation would in all likelihood follow the example of a Dutch Court which declared an action of the so-called "Mothers of Srebrenica" against the state inadmissible, precisely because the Dutch contingent in Srebrenica during the Bosnian actions was under UN command and the UN enjoyed immunity in the Dutch courts.
Th e Varying Approaches of the European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice to Sanctions Measures
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It is also important to recall that the ECtHR devoted specifi c reasoning to its lack of jurisdiction over the UN beyond the simple consideration that the UN as organisation was not a party to the European Convention. Th e Court advanced the view that actions within the framework of UN authorized operations were vital for the accomplishment by the Security Council of its specifi c tasks that it was charged with under chapter VII of the Charter. Th us they were vital to the achievement of the fundamental objective of the UN to maintain international peace and security.
13 Th e Court suggested here that its 'solange test' as applied in the Bosphorus case was not applicable in the framework of chapter VII operations. In other words: fundamental rights can be abridged by the UN Security Council in certain situations.
14 Th e Court of Justice of the European Union, in its diff erent incarnations as the Court of First Instance and the European Court of Justice as cour de cassation, also showed diff erent degrees of deference to the European implementation of "smart sanctions" taken by the Security Council for reasons linked to 15 See Kadi 2005 (supra n. 7) par. 226. It should be noted in passing that the CFI gave an extra-ordinarily broad interpretation to the notion of ius cogens, including in it by implication the right to property and the fundamental rights of procedure of Mr Kadi, only to come to the conclusion that even in this (overly) broad conception of ius cogens these rights had not been violated. 16 Th is is in contrast to the conception of article 103 of the Charter, which sees this provision essentially as a principle determining the hierarchy of treaties and according to which the obligations under chapter VII fall on the member states. Th is would have to leave Community law, including its fundamental rules of a primary nature, to one side under the edict of article 103 in favour of the UN Charter and the UNSC resolutions based on it. the latter's fundamental responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security in the world.
In the famous Kadi case, concerning the implementation of Security Council (UNSC) sanctions that demanded the freezing of Mr Kadi's assets, the Court of First Instance (CFI, now called the General Court since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty) went even further than the ECtHR in accepting that measures taken for the implementation of Security Council resolutions under chapter VII of the Charter would be exempt from judicial review in case of alleged breaches of fundamental rights. Th e CFI struggled mightily with the relationship between the Security Council resolution placing Mr Kadi on the so-called sanctions list and the Community acts implementing this resolution, because it believed that they were de facto indistinguishable and that quashing the EC implementation measure implied that the Security Council resolution was also undermined. Th e CFI felt that even by implication it should not review a Security Council resolution, except possibly on the basis of ius cogens to which in its view the Security Council was bound just as much as any subject of international law. 15 Where the CFI went further than the ECtHR in Behrami & Saramati was in giving great weight to articles 25 and 103 of the Charter as creating obligations (even if indirectly through the Member States) for the Community. In this way the binding character of the resolution (article 25) and the supremacy of the resolution of the Security Council over not just other treaties, but also over Community primary law, would weigh just as much on the Community as on UN Member States. Th is recognizes the Community on the one hand as a separate entity under the UN system 16 but on the other hand makes it entirely subservient to the UN policy on peace and security, even if that policy has been laid down in Security Council resolutions in a manner so as to put in peril the fundamental rights of Community citizens.
It is this conception of the Community as, on the one hand, autonomous to a certain degree, but on the other hand, as subservient to the UN Security Council that became an issue in the appeals procedure before the European Court of Justice launched by Mr Kadi. Stimulated by the radical position of its Advocate-General, Miguel Poiares Maduro, the ECJ took the view that the 17 See Kadi 2008 (supra n. 7) par. 334, 361, 368-370. 18 Th e authors use the word 'regional' here strictly in a factual sense and express no viewpoint on whether the EC/EU in the past or the EU at present can be regarded as a 'regional organisation' within the meaning of article 53 Charter, which entails a consequential subordination ab initio to the Security Council for the organisation in question. 19 Although certain passages of the ECJ's Kadi 2008 decision may hint at a sort of dialogue between the regional and the UN legal order; see particularly paras. 321 and 374.
relative autonomy of the European Community/Union in respect of the UN ought to have consequences for its acceptance of implementing measures of Security Council resolutions, which breached the fundamental rights of Mr Kadi, where it concerned his right to a proper procedure and his right to property. 17 Here the Court relied on the formal distinction that the CFI had so struggled with, namely the distinction between the UNSC resolution and the Community implementation measures. Th e Court emphasized that it confi ned its judgment strictly to the legality of the Community implementation measures and that this was no refl ection on the Security Council resolution, even if the contents of the latter were in reality largely identical to those of the former. However, as Mr Maduro had already stressed, there was no alternative to taking one's own legal order seriously and, at least within it, protecting the Community citizens against any breach of their fundamental rights. Th us in the end the maintenance of individual rights within a "regional" organisation 18 should prevail over the claims to the maintenance of world order issuing from the United Nations. Th ere is little doubt that this can create great tensions between the regional and world-wide levels of the international legal order. We will come back to this below.
From ' Avoidance' to 'Engagement': Th e Political and Judicial Dialogue between the UN and Regional Institutions on the Implementation of Sanctions
As we have seen, the judicial decisions reviewed so far seem to be premised on diff erent approaches, ranging from subordination to autonomy. Yet, independently of the approach taken, courts have tended to avoid tackling the legal issues raised by the chapter VII resolutions of the Security Council. Indeed, whether we take the ECJ's rhetoric on the autonomy of the EU legal orderinspired by the position of Advocate General Maduro -or we look at the ECtHR's and CFI's attitude of (more or less nuanced) subordination towards the norms or values enshrined in the international legal order, we end up confronted with a number of legal techniques craft ed to avoid entering into a dialogue between the regional and the UN legal order. 19 Th at has entailed a dearth of refl ection as to the possible ways to reach systemic coherence and to 20 In this respect, it has been noticed that principles such as those of subsidiarity and of complementarity may help in addressing the incoherence stemming from the growing complexity of the international legal order. Th is goal may also be fostered through a number of legal techniques, such as that of the national margin of appreciation or that of formal equivalence. In the light of the foregoing, a refl ection as to the causes of such an attitude of avoidance seems to be warranted. Could this attitude be due to the limited competence of regional courts? Th e articulation of a framework for judicial review of Security Council action (even if only indirectly by review of regional implementation measures) meets obstacles of a systemic character, having to do with the shaping of the international judicial space. Regional courts by their nature can only act within the confi nes of their (regional) competence. Th erefore, almost by defi nition they cannot fully apprehend and judge the totality of the measures ordered by the Security Council and their underlying rationale. Th us they retreat behind formal mechanisms of avoidance.
Th is is, however, not entirely satisfactory as an explanation. It suffi ces to note that a similar attitude of avoidance surfaces also in the Sayadi decision taken by the Human Rights Committee.
21 Th e review of national measures exercised by the Committee is potentially universal in scope and based on a set of uniform standards. Th at off ers an advantage compared to the circumscribed protection aff orded by regional judicial instances. Yet, the Committee seems to have been reluctant to fully grasp this opportunity. Th e reasoning expounded in Sayadi is rather simplistic: the Committee confi nes itself to analyzing the conduct of the defendant State in light of its obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereinaft er: ICCPR), glossing over the issue of normative confl ict between the Covenant and the UN Charter and, even more tellingly, omitting any reference to article 103 of the Charter. In the end, one is left with another missed opportunity to spell out the relationship between the UN legal order and norms for the protection of human rights. 
Th e Strategy of 'Conforming Interpretation'
In spite of the remarks made above, the Sayadi case off ers some clues on a more elaborate strategy, aimed at addressing the legal issues posed by the practice of the Security Council's blacklists. We refer in particular to the position on conforming interpretation 23 contained in Sir Nigel Rodley's Individual Opinion attached to the Sayadi decision. According to Sir Nigel, the Committee should pronounce itself on the existence of a normative confl ict between the obligations under the UN Charter and those under the Covenant. On the basis of this analysis, it shall be decided whether article 103 has to be applied or not. Th e crucial point here is how to defi ne a normative confl ict.
Sir Nigel puts forward four main criteria for such a defi nition, formulated as interpretative presumptions about the Council's intention of derogating from human rights norms. To start with, he refers to a general presumption of conformity between human rights norms and Security Council resolutions if their wording does not exclude such conformity explicitly. Next, he posits a presumption of conformity between Security Council resolutions and ius cogens and with the non-derogable rights contained in the Covenant. Finally, a presumption of strict necessity and proportionality is invoked, when it comes to the restriction of rights from which derogation is not allowed under the Covenant. As it appears, it is particularly through the third and fourth criteria that Sir Nigel attempts to spell out the relationship between the ICCPR and the UN Charter. Indeed, by making reference to the nonderogable character of certain rights and to the standards governing the possibility to derogate from certain other rights, he seems to take into account the situation of emergency arising in connection with international terrorist activities. 24 In our view, Sir Nigel Rodley's approach goes to the heart of the complex relationship between the Security Council and regional judicial organs engaged in the protection of human rights provoked by the Council's action against international terrorism. Indeed, it demonstrates the importance of respecting the rule of law at the UN level. When applied to the Security Council, this means that, above all, the Council must accept that its action is subject to the legal limits imposed by fundamental rights. Indeed, as recalled by the ICTY in the Tadić case 'In any case, neither the text nor the spirit of the Charter conceives of the Security Council as legibus solutus (un bound by law)' . 24 Even more importantly, the 2005 World Summit Outcome envisages that:
Sanctions should be implemented and monitored eff ectively with clear benchmarks and should be periodically reviewed, as appropriate, and remain for as limited a period as necessary to achieve their objectives and should be terminated once the objectives have been achieved. 25 
Th e 'Carrot and Stick' Strategy
Th e requirement to guarantee the respect for the rule of law has inspired a further 'positive' strategy, emerging in the pronouncements of a few domestic courts 26 and in a series of diplomatic initiatives taken within the Council of Europe. 27 We could speak of it as a 'carrot and stick' approach. 28 Before dealing with the impugned domestic act, the Court indulged in a harsh critique of the sanctions regime imposed by resolution 1267 and deemed it 'a denial of basic legal remedies' and 'untenable under the principles of international human rights' . As it appears, this reasoning entails a twofold dimension. While criticising the Council, the Court fi nally opts for a review of the domestic measure of implementation only, omitting to deal with the legality of the resolution at stake. Th e blending of these two attitudes suggests the endorsement of a 'carrot and stick' approach, though in the concrete case the stick comes fi rst. Th is approach has found an echo also in other decisions of national courts and has not been overlooked by the Security Council. On the contrary, it is likely that these pronouncements have triggered the improvements to the sanctions regime recently made by the Council.
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Leaving aside the judicial context, a 'carrot and stick' approach has surfaced also in the Council of Europe, especially through the expert reports dealing with the Council's practice of blacklisting. Th e Marty Report, for instance, proposes that the Secretary General of the Council of Europe shall require information from Member States as to the application of the ECHR. Additionally, the report calls upon the Parliamentary Assembly "s' en prendre directement et à loisir aux résolutions du Conseil qu' elle jugerait contraires aux droits de l'homme" and to exercise its infl uence over the states responsible for the elaboration of resolutions that might have even more direct and immediate eff ects. 30 Admittedly, this 'carrot and stick' approach is somewhat heterodox. A more conventional way for regional organisations to communicate their position would have entailed a direct exchange of views between them and the UN during the period of conception of the sanctions regime. Th at could have happened on numerous occasions, such as the meetings between the Security Council and regional organisations or the high-level meetings among the UN, 31 UN Secretary General. 32 However, these opportunities have repeatedly been missed and today the Council is caught into an indirect dialogue, obliging it to react to the allegations of illegality coming from domestic jurisdictions and from regional political fora. A response by the Council, in fact, becomes urgent, since the very respect for the measures adopted by it is put in question and, therefore, potentially hampered.
Th e Reaction of the Security Council: the Creation of the Offi ce of the Ombudsperson
In response to the above-mentioned critiques and to a number of other diplomatic initiatives, 33 the Security Council has adopted resolution 1904 (2009), 34 which potentially heralds a new era in the implementation of anti-terror sanctions. Th e rationale behind this resolution is fairly straightforward: the functioning of the sanctioning regime is seen as depending not only on the eff ectiveness of the adopted measures, but also on the existence of procedures guaranteeing their pertinence in casu. Along these lines, resolution 1904 innovates from previous resolutions by introducing an Ombudsperson, 35 charged with examining the requests for delisting submitted by sanctions-aff ected individuals and entities. Th e Ombudsperson, in fact, has more powers than the so-called Focal Points set up by resolution 1730.
As is well known, the Focal Points mainly operate within an interstate framework; which is confi rmed by the following elements. First, any request for delisting received by a Focal Point has to be communicated to the government(s) responsible for the complainant's inscription on the list as well as to the State of nationality and of residence of the listed person or entity (). recommend the removal of the complainant's name from the list. 37 If, aft er one month from the receipt of the request, no Committee member recommends such de-listing, it shall be deemed rejected and the Chairman of the Committee shall inform the Focal Point accordingly.
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Th e provisions of resolution 1904 (2009) on the Ombudsperson improve this process in several respects. Overall, the tasks entrusted to the Ombud sperson are designed to foster the effi cacy of the information gathering process and to improve the interaction among the actors involved in the phase of decision-making. Th e work of the Ombudsperson, aft er receipt of a de-listing request is divided into three parts of each two months' duration.
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First there is a period of information gathering, during which the Ombud sperson does not need to rely exclusively on information given to her by the complainant and the States concerned, but can also herself search for additional information.
40 Th e second two months' period is devoted to dialogue and engagement. Th e Ombudsperson will establish a dialogue with the complainant and can also act as go-between between the complainant and the States concerned. 41 At the end of the second period -which may, if necessary, be prolonged with another two months -the Ombudsperson will issue a socalled comprehensive report on the request for delisting. 42 Th is report will be drawn up with the help of the Monitoring Team, but since it concerns matters that require an independent assessment, is written by and issued under the responsibility of the Ombudsperson alone. 43 Given the way it has been prepared, this report to the Committee gives access to a broader range of information than was hitherto the case, thus allowing a more accurate analysis of each case.
Aft er this second period, a third period follows during which the Sanctions Committee must arrive at a decision on the request for de-listing. Th is will involve intensive discussions with the Ombudsperson, who will herself present her report to the Sanctions Committee. "Aft er the Committee consideration, the Committee shall decide whether to approve the delisting request through its normal decision-making procedures. " 44 In this way, the fate of a request is less dependent on the discretion of the Committee members entitled to take action according to resolution 1730. Indeed, since the Committee 45 In the UK for example the authority referred to in the PMOI cases, the Proscribed Organisations Appeals Commission (POAC), see ECR II-03019, in which the CFI could rely on the fact that in the UK the POAC (see n. 45 supra) had ruled that the PMOI could no longer be regarded as a terrorist organisation. 48 It is remarkable to see how this tendency changes if the national authorities, for instance a prosecutor's offi ce, insist on regarding somebody as a suspect in a terrorist case. Deference to that national authority seems to be the reaction prevailing in such cases. Th is was the case in the case of Sofi ane Fahas, against whom a provisional arrest warrant for terrorist activities had been issued by the prosecuting judge (juge d'instruction) in Naples, see Case T-49/07 Sofi ane Fahas v. Council, Judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) 7 December 2010, n.y.r.
is bound to take a formal decision, silence in case of inaction by any of the Committee members is no longer enough to quash a request for de-listing. On the whole one can say that the functions vested in the Ombudsperson are conceived so as to create an independent third party, enjoying a certain freedom in the collection of information and thereby giving the impression of acting according to a transparent and fair procedure.
Th e Reaction of National Courts, the EU General Court and a UN Special Rapporteur to the Creation of the Offi ce of the Ombudsperson
It is to be noted at the outset of this section that the European national courts and the Court of First Instance (later the General Court) had been much more at ease in judging cases concerning people placed on the lists linked to UNSC resolution 1373. In that system of sanctions resolutions, relating to international terrorism other than Al Qaeda and the Taliban, the UN list was ultimately based on requests from national governments, which had to use offi cial criminal investigations, accusations or convictions (in absentia) as the basis for communicating names to the UN. Th is made it much easier for national courts or quasi-judicial authorities 45 to insist on full review and criticise or even delegitimize the actions of the national authorities. Th is, in turn, made it much simpler for the CFI and later the General Court, basing themselves on such rulings at the national level, to wipe cases, in which national authorities just went on placing the persons or organisations concerned again on the list, off the table with some gusto. Th is was the case with Mr Sison in the Netherlands 46 and with the PMOI/OMPI in the UK and France. 47 Such cases also did not carry the same risk of inexorably opposing the EU to the UN Security Council decision to put somebody on the list, as in the Al Qaeda and Taliban sanctions system. In such cases the General Court was at ease using more stick than carrot. Th e same lack of patience with the Union's institutions that meekly accepted again and again such fl awed proposals for the terrorist list from some Member States, can also be felt in the General Court's reactions, when it was called upon to rule again on Mr Kadi's continued placing on the Al Qaeda terrorist list (Kadi 2010). Th is was aft er the Union's authorities had gone through the motions of following the Court of Justice's negative judgment of 2008 (Kadi 2008) by subjecting Mr Kadi to a new procedure in response to his request to be taken off the list, at least in Brussels.
Th e General Court initially followed the Court of Justice's judgment in Kadi 2008 only reluctantly and protesting a bit too much, 49 but later in its judgment it saw many parallels between how the Court of Justice dealt with Kadi 2005 and how it itself threw out the PMOI II case. 50 Th us the General Court did not hesitate to draw the conclusion that Kadi's rights of defence had been infringed once again. 51 Th is was based on the fact that Mr Kadi was put through a new procedure both at the UN and at the EU level before the Offi ce of the Ombudsperson became operational. Th erefore his procedure followed the Focal Points mechanism in the UN, which had already been implicitly rejected by the Court of Justice in Kadi 2008 as inadequate. Moreover, he had only be advised of a summary of the reasons why he was placed on the list. Th e General Court also pointed to the important diff erence between the procedures followed in cases based on resolution 1373 (terrorist activities other than Al Qaeda and the Taliban), such as the OMPI and PMOI cases, where at least judicial review at the national level had been possible, and the present case where the procedure at Community level is marked by an absence of eff ective judicial review that can remedy or sanction the lack of a guarantee of the rights of defence at the level of the administrative procedure.
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In the end the General Court thus came easily to the conclusion that Mr Kadi had once more been the victim of a breach of his rights of defence 53 Th e impression that also in Kadi 2010 the General Court was wielding the stick rather than proff ering the carrot to the UN is confi rmed by a number of other pronouncements by the Court relating directly or indirectly to the offi ce of the Ombudsperson and its functioning.
First of all, the Court recalled what it said in PMOI II about communication to the Court of elements contained in the national fi le communicated by a Member State to the Council and/or the Commission.
53 Th e Court repeated that if the Member State in question is not willing to authorize the communication of such fi le to the Community judicature whose task it is to review the lawfulness of the Community decision based on that fi le, and even rejects communication to the Court alone, 54 the ineluctable conclusion must be that the Court is unable to review the lawfulness of that decision and thus the right to judicial protection is denied. 55 On the positive (carrot) side, it can be noted that it would seem that the Union's judicial authorities are at least considering the possibility of ex parte communication of the national fi le.
Th e Court made another interesting remark of principle. It put in doubt whether aft er the more than 10 years during which Mr Kadi had been subject to an asset freezing decision, it and other courts could still continue to rely on the preventative, provisional and temporary character of such asset freezing.
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Finally -and here it is again the stick that dominates the General Court's approach -it thinks fi t to give a shot across the bow of the Offi ce of the Ombudsperson at a time when the occupant of that Offi ce, Mrs Kimberley Prost, a former ad litem judge in the ICTY, had been in offi ce for barely four months. Th e Court notes that, in spite of the Ombudsperson's presence, the removal of a person from the list still takes consensus, even if now a positive vote is necessary, as signalled above. Th e disclosure of the evidence to the person on the list remains a matter entirely in the hands of the Member State who proposed the person for inclusion in the list in the fi rst place. Th e person in question has no right to even know the name of the proposing State and there is no guarantee that the information, if it is given, is suffi cient for the person to mount his defence eff ectively. "For those reasons", the Court concluded, "the creation of (…) the Offi ce of the Ombudsperson cannot be equated with the provision of an eff ective judicial procedure for review of the decisions of the Sanctions Committee". Committee, a political organ, that decides on the basis of confi dentiality and by consensus and without much transparency vis-à-vis the listed person or the general public whether a person will be delisted. Th ere is no guarantee that the report of the Ombudsperson on a case will be published.
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Th ese considerations bring Special Rapporteur Scheinin to the conclusion that the sanctions regime of SC Res 1267 (1999) is based on an ultra vires act of the Security Council, exceeding its powers under chapter VII of the Charter. Th at will remain the case unless and until the Ombudsperson or the Council itself is equipped with quasi-judicial powers. As long as the Ombudsperson is not equipped with decision-making power, she "cannot be regarded as a tribunal within the meaning of article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. " In the meantime, individuals and entities listed have no other remedies than those provided by domestic or regional judicial review of the national or regional implementing measures, such as that provided by the UK courts and by the European Court of Justice. 
Th e First Months of the Offi ce of the Ombudsperson
On 3 June 2010 Mrs Prost was appointed by the UN Secretary-General to the Offi ce of the Ombudsperson. In late October she unveiled a bit of her approach to her offi ce in a briefi ng to an informal meeting of the legal advisors of the Member States, 61 in late January 2011 she published her fi rst biannual report on her activities to the Security Council 62 and in late February she planned to fi nalise her fi rst comprehensive report to the Sanctions Committee on the fi rst case of the seven that have been submitted to her so far. 63 From Mrs Prost's statement to the legal advisors and from her fi rst report to the Security Council it is clear that she has a robust approach to her offi ce. She quite rightly takes the Supreme Court of England and Wales and the EU General Court to task for having declared her offi ce inadequate at a moment that it was not or only barely functioning and without giving her a fair hearing. 64 Th us the dialogue with the national and regional courts seems to begin with an exchange of stick strokes. It is interesting to note, however, that she does not react to the criticism contained in Martin Scheinin's report.
In reality, the dialogue has been well engaged, since Mrs Prost is clearly aware where the diffi cult points in the Sanctions Committee procedure are located according to the national and regional courts in question. From her briefi ng and her report to the Security Council one gets the strong impression that she hopes that, perhaps in an unorthodox fashion and with herself as intermediary, she can achieve the equivalent of a fair hearing for people who apply to be de-listed under the regime of Security Council resolution 1267. She fully realizes that if she does not succeed in this, the Security Council regime of 'smart sanctions' may be in peril. 65 Th us, she hopes to extend a carrot to the courts that have rejected her Offi ce seemingly out of hand, which they might fi nd diffi cult to refuse.
Mrs Prost is trying to get the Member States, particularly those which have regularly proposed persons or entities to be placed on the list, to move on two points that have been important, for instance, to the General Court in Kadi 2010. First of all, from her Report it transpires that she is trying to make these States budge on their policy of refusing the disclosure of their identity to the person who seeks to be de-listed. She states that this policy puts the listed person at a disadvantage in answering the case against him and that disclosure may even be useful to other Member States in helping them to obtain more information on the case. If the Ombudsperson is not in a position to reveal the proposing State's identity, "it constitutes a potential impediment to due process" in her view. 66 Th ere can indeed be little doubt about that. 67 Briefi ng, p. 6. It is interesting to note that in her Report, at par. 25, she states that she is still seeking for a defi ned standard by which this question can be answered and that "properly refl ects the serious nature and particular context of decisions of the Al Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee and at the same time recognizes the signifi cant eff ect of the sanctions on the listed individuals and entities". Th is promises to be a diffi cult balancing test.
Secondly, Mrs Prost is seeking a way to gain access to classifi ed and confi dential information from the proposing States. To this end, she is looking for mechanisms that will give these States assurances that such information will be suffi ciently protected by her Offi ce, while enabling her to form the best possible answer to the question: "Is this individual or entity on the list today on a suffi cient basis?" 67 Th e big question is, of course, whether she will succeed in all of this, and as proof of that success, on the one hand get a certain number of the petitioners delisted, and on the other hand be put in the position by the Committee to publish a convincing report in those cases where persons are not delisted. If the Ombudsperson succeeds in doing all of that, will it all be enough, as she put it in her briefi ng? She will certainly have provided a number of answers to the qualms of the General Court in Kadi 2010. Th at Court also seemed willing to entertain the idea of contemplating ex parte information under protective arrangements. Would it be willing to do so with information received under protective orders by the Ombudsperson, ex parte once removed, so to say? Th at is uncertain, but at least the dialogue seems to be well and truly engaged.
Conclusions
Th us the dialogue between the regional level and the worldwide level is continuing. It is now the turn of the UN level, through the Ombudsperson, to proff er a carrot to the regional level. Whether she will be able to do so remains uncertain at the time of writing and will only become really clear aft er she has treated a number of cases. If the proposing States do not give her a chance to succeed (by not collaborating in protective mechanisms under which the Ombudsperson can consult classifi ed information from their fi les and by not consenting that their identity shall be made known to the petitioner), the conclusion is foregone and the UN sanctions system will be in dire straits, as the national and regional courts will see no reason to show fl exibility on their part.
If Mrs Prost succeeds, however, the question is whether the regional and national courts must keep to their strict approach, according to which only full judicial control at Security Council level is enough. If such judicial control were to remain limited to cases where the rights of individuals are at stake, it might not be entirely outside the realm of the possible. Th e possibility of full judicial control in such cases has been introduced for example in the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy. 68 Nevertheless, even such a system may be a bridge too far for the Security Council. Would the regional courts then take the risk of blowing up de facto the Security Council system of sanctions against individuals, which has been set up for reasons related to modern day terrorism on an international scale? If the UN system of sanctions is indeed, as Mrs Prost has put it, unique and therefore deserves to be treated as such, also by the judicial powers of Member States and regional organisations, why should these Courts not look for a system providing an "adequate level of protection", 69 if this can be guaranteed in practice by the Offi ce of the Ombudsperson and possibly a further exchange of information between the Ombudsperson and the national and regional courts?
Th e crucial point in all of this is that the dialogue between the regional level and the universal level should contribute to establishing a working system that demonstrates that the accountability of the international organisations and the courts involved in the system at both levels is seriously improved. Th is includes the necessary minimum transparency. It is submitted that even a less than perfect system that does not deliver full judicial review of sanctions imposed on individuals under full transparency, may still contribute to a degree of accountability that would meet the requirement of an 'adequate level of protection' .
On the other hand, a cleaner solution may well be the one suggested, though as yet a bit sotto voce, by Special Rapporteur Martin Scheinin. 70 Is it worth it to continue to tinker with the 'unique' Security Council system of freezing of assets, whilst the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism of 1999 has now been ratifi ed by 173 States 71 and provides for a normal criminal law approach to this phenomenon? Perhaps the time is there to drop the Security Council approach to the fi nancing of terrorism and revert to the Convention that was created at about the same time as SC Res 1267 was adopted. 72 As stated above, the dialogue between the regional and universal level on the protection of the fundamental rights of individuals in the process of the fi ght against the kind of terrorism that constitutes a threat to international peace and security is well and truly engaged. It is diffi cult to predict the outcome. Above we have referred to a number of elements that could play a role in the solution. However, there can be little doubt that, whatever happens, the Ombudsperson will be for some time between a rock and a hard place and that it will require all Mrs Prost's skill to extricate herself from there and bring us closer to a satisfactory solution.
